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Pakistan’s political development is once again 
on the edge. If one believes the domestic and 
international media, the civilian leaders are 
finally trying to initiate a serious 
transformation process towards a 
consolidated democracy. Celebrating 
themselves, the two main political parties are 
emphasizing the appearance and 
strengthening of a more or less stable ‘quasi-
two-party-system’, the ability to form 
coalitions, to build consensus and the 
discovery of a new parliamentary spirit. Being 
overwhelmed by the ability to have survived a 
full tenure and to witness the first democratic 
transfer of power in the country’s history, 
Pakistan’s sedate and slow political 
mastodons, i.e. the Pakistan People Party 
(PPP) of incumbent President Asif Ali Zardari 
and the leading opposition party Pakistan 
Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) of the 
brothers Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif, seem to 
ignore a political phenomenon that gained 
increasing prominence over the last years. 
This was interpreted by several analysts as a 
laxness which might have far reaching 
consequences for the contemporary and 
future development of the country. In brief, 
the emergence of Imran Khan and his 
Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), known as the 
Movement for Justice, developed into a force 
to be reckoned with and was apparently 
disturbing the enthusiasm of the established 
political stalwarts. Interestingly, this time it is 
not the Pakistani army but a cricketer-turned-
politician that acts as the spoiler for the mood 
for democracy in Islamabad’s political circles. 
Khan’s so-called ‘political Tsunami’ not only 
disturbs the ‘feel good atmosphere’ of the 
PPP and PML-N but may also induce a major 
restructuring of Pakistan’s unstable party 
system. Caught by surprise with Khan’s rising 
prominence, both parties initially remained 
shiftless in dealing with the PTI. Until recently, 
there was no pressing need to worry because 
with its single seat the PTI played a marginal 
role of importance in Pakistan’s national 
parliament. Yet, recent polls suggest that 
Imran Khan may well be on his way to a 
‘grand electoral achievement’ which would 
catapult the PTI into the government and him 
into the position of Prime Minister, or, in a less 
bright scenario, put him into the role of a 
‘king-maker’. Nevertheless, one has to realize 
that he has only been able to make some 
remarkable progress in the Punjab, and more 
specifically in Lahore, his only ‘stronghold’. 
This is gaining particular momentum as it is 
also the ‘homeland’ of one of Khan’s greatest 
political rivals, the PML-N. That party’s 
overwhelming dominance in the national 
assembly (it occupies more than 50% of the 
seats) will make sure that the PTI will have no 
landslide victory this province, which is 
Pakistan’s most important. However, at the 
moment it seems that Khan and Nawaz Sharif 
have made an arrangement about not 
challenging the establishment in Punjab, 
meaning to maintain the status quo after 
successful elections (including subsequent 
socio-economic inequalities) as well as 
certain electoral arrangements. This will 
provide Khan with a more or less valid 
guarantee of a certain power base in form of 
an amount of seats to count with, at least in 
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theory. The PML-N is also gaining much from 
such a ‘political deal’, since it helps to ‘keeps 
its back free’ in order to challenge its major 
rival, the PPP, in their ‘homeland’ Sindh. In 
this context, one has to state that the PML-N 
has been investing a lot of time and effort in 
this province in order to get a stronger 
political foothold there. In sum, Khan’s 
notions of ‘progressive change and revolution’ 
got victimised in Punjab in order to improve 
its chances in the next elections.  
 
Similar developments are observed in in other 
provinces too. The PTI will find it hard to rival 
the PPP in rural Sindh, the powerful MQM in 
Sindh’s capital Karachi, or to take on the 
strong regional parties in Balochistan, Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), and Federal Tribal 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). It will be 
difficult for the PTI to break the strong 
influence of the established parties which are 
able to draw on tribal or other traditional 
loyalties among the rural population 
generating whole vote banks for them. In 
order to compete with them, Khan started a 
strategy of convincing eminent political 
figures from other political camps to join his 
party to extend the PTI’s influence in other 
provinces. However, the reliability of these 
individuals remains questionable because 
they may be chose to join the PTI out of 
opportunism rather than out of idealism. Such 
motives do not enhance the creation of a 
sustainable future of the party and the 
implementation of a coherent and substantial 
policy programme.  
 
Analysts are wondering about the sources of 
Imran Khan’s rise. Most of them identify the 
increasing unpopularity of the PPP 
government as the main reason for Khan’s 
popularity. Consequently, the PTI could 
establish itself as a protest movement cum 
political party that vies for national 
significance. In this context one should 
mentioned that Khan’s movement got side-
lined early 2013 by Muhammad Tahir-ul Qadri 
who was stole the ‘electioneering show’ from 
Imran Khan as the country’s best-known 
populist. Even though Khan lost media 
attention for only a couple of weeks, the fact 
that Tahir-ul-Qadri was able to brush aside 
Khan’s ‘public visibility’ had a significant 
impact on the PTI’s momentum. It 
disenchanted the people about the 
sustainability of Khan’s ‘political Tsunami’. 
Furthermore, Khan lost its status of being the 
‘darling of the media’ which marked the 
starting point for a whole wave of more critical 
reporting on Khan’s statements and policies 
as well as the performance and activities of 
the PTI.  
 
Regardless of whether Khan will achieve 
direct power in Islamabad or not, he will be 
able, if one is reading the earlier pre-election 
polls, to establish himself and his PTI for the 
next tenure as a third political force, next to 
the PPP and PML-N, on the national level in 
the country. Even though Khan still lacks a 
nationwide, substantial support base, the fact 
that the next election will have around 30 
million new and young voters looking for 
political orientation might function as a game 
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changer. It could create a moment which will 
help Imran Khan finally to acquire a national 
character and his PTI to go beyond the status 
of a ‘pressure group’. According to analysts, 
there are still legitimate reasons to assume 
that PTI can benefit from that since Khan has 
won the sympathies among many young 
voters, especially in the urban middle class 
which is frustrated about the social and 
economic conditions in the country. The latest 
electoral rallies in the last two years as well 
as the tremendous success of his internet 
campaign, especially his social network 
activities, were an impressive demonstration 
of his capabilities to mobilise exactly these 
young voters en masse. At his most recent 
rallies in Lahore and Karachi, more than 
100.000 people participated; which 
numerically challenges the attendance of 
political gatherings of the PML-N and PPP. In 
qualitative terms too are Khans rallies, or 
Jalsas, remarkable. Despite the fact that 
these Jalsas were ‘entertaining festivals’ 
rather than serious political events -which for 
Imran Khan of course had the advantage of 
distracting his followers and sympathisers 
from the extraordinary limited ‘political 
message’ which basically boils down to a 
claim to make an end to corruption, to stop 
drone attacks, and to reshuffle US-Pakistani 
relations- Khan was able to proof two things: 
First, there was or still is a rally-behind-the-
PTI-flag phenomenon of Pakistan (urban) 
youth with an remarkable percentage of the 
educated ones. Second, the PTI is on a good 
way to arrive at the national level. Imran Khan 
has been able to create an impressive 
political dynamic by cleverly using Pakistan’s 
contemporary political issues to his own 
benefits. Nevertheless, one must question if 
he is able to achieve more, beyond a 
respectable electoral result particularly 
regarding a successful implementation of its 
proposed policies. In more comprehensive 
terms: to gain, exercise and maintain political 
power!  
 
Therefore most important is that Khan is able 
to stop the ‘disenchantment with politics’ of 
Pakistan’s whole youth and not only the urban 
educated middle classes. Since they 
associate Khan with the hope that he will 
change the whole system by giving the 
country a political landscape a new fresh, 
progressive impetus, it is a conditio sine qua 
non for the PTI’s success to maintain this 
image. However, undoubtedly this is at the 
moment the major problem of Khan. Being 
obviously driven by the ultimately pursuit of 
power but hampered by an insufficient 
electoral support base Khan is willing to join 
increasingly alliances of all kind of political 
colours. However, his attempt to line up with 
the radical religious right, the military and the 
Taliban will have the gravest consequences. 
This has far-reaching consequences: for 
Khan, his PTI, and for the country’s 
democratic future. Especially on some of the 
core values of democracy and underlining 
ideational like liberalism, tolerance, individual 
freedom and well-being, equality, freedom of 
religion and speech, human rights including 
liberties of women. 
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To begin with, it is argued here that Khan’s 
appeasement towards the radical religious 
groups and his remarkable shady approach 
towards the Taliban further create an 
atmosphere in which fundamentalism and 
religious extremism can grow rampantly. 
Through his action or indifference, Khan 
contributed to the raising political prominence 
and influence of the Taliban in Pakistan. Most 
noteworthy is Khan’s increasingly 
appreciation of the Taliban for their values 
and principles. This finds its strongest 
expression in the fact that the PTI leader was 
publicly praising the terrorist activities of the 
Taliban in Afghanistan as a ‘holy war’ which in 
his view is justified by Islam. By doing so he 
implicitly also legitimizes the war crimes and 
atrocities like public executions of women in 
Taliban controlled areas. For obvious reasons 
Khan’s elaborations on the Taliban’s activities 
in Afghanistan have not gone down well with 
the Afghans.  
 
Furthermore, Khan’s expressed deep 
affection towards the ‘Jihadists’ is even more 
disturbing since the above mentioned 
statement was done after a hospital visit of 
Malala Yousafzai, a young Pakistani girl 
asking for female education, who was should 
in the head by them. The fact that he did not 
condemn the attackers and failed to portray 
the Taliban as perpetrators showed that he 
has a weak spot for religious extremists. It 
created a societal and political environment in 
which a federal minister could call terrorists 
‘his brothers’ and in which politicians of the 
religious right can downplay the shooting of 
school girls as a ‘drama’, and that 
commentators can denounce such an 
extraordinary atrocity as an exaggerate issue 
by the media. This is denouncing the 
legitimate outrage as a displaced and staged 
spectacle and one should not make a big deal 
out of it. In other words, this is not only a 
public discrediting of human rights but it also 
shows the weak status of fundamental rights 
and democratic norms and values in the 
country. Here one should also add that 
Khan’s legitimization of Taliban actions in 
Pakistan with reference to victims of drone 
attacks is a deliberate distortion of facts and 
obviously aims to misguide the Pakistani 
people and international community. It seems 
that Khan and his sympathisers have a very 
weak memory when it comes to all the blown 
up schools in the area by Taliban, the 
systematic killings of tribal elders and other 
people willing to stand up against the 
repressive tactics of Taliban and associates, 
especially the forced introduction of Sharia 
law.  
 
Of course drone attacks are against human 
rights and the people in the FATA have a right 
to live in peace. However, by blaming the US 
one-sidedly for growing militancy is absolute 
nonsense. The FATA has been struggling with 
militancy and its functioning as a ‘black-site’ 
for endeavours of regional actors well before 
the beginning of the ‘war against terror’. 
Consequently, the increase of new and 
deepening of old conflicts and cleavages and 
the taking up of arms in the area is not a 
‘collateral damage’ of US drone strikes. It is 
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rather a consequence of the disturbance of 
the traditional social structure and tribal 
notion of harmony which is mainly of 
domestic origin and troubling the area since 
decades. It was easy for the Taliban to fill this 
power vacuum and to get hold of FATA. In this 
context one should mention that Khan should 
first examine the indigenous social, cultural 
and religious flaws of the cause of militancy 
before blaming foreign sources. Therefore, 
side-lining with the extremists is not bringing 
peace at all to the people of the frontier 
region. In contrast, they feel much 
encouraged to continue their strategy of 
violence and intimidation since three of the 
current most significant political parties PPP, 
PML-N and PTI are obviously afraid of acting 
against them. The capitulation of these major 
national civilian forces towards the Taliban is 
best outlined by two occasions: First, Khan 
publicly announced that he can’t condemn the 
Taliban for their crimes because he has to 
protect his own PTI officials and 
sympathisers. Literally, “we have local 
affiliates and supporters. Sure I can give big 
statements against the Taliban but that would 
make them Taliban targets”. Second, PPP 
and PML-N were even not able to find a 
consensus to pass a bill in order to use force 
against Taliban in the affected areas. Facing 
upcoming election, no politician in Islamabad 
wants to be responsible for a major internal 
military operation as well as to provoke the 
Taliban. For the moment it seems that this 
strategy is working out at least for the PTI and 
PML-N, since Taliban are only attacking the 
election campaigns and candidates of secular 
regional parties in FATA and KPK sparing the 
Punjab from its fight against democracy.  
 
By witnessing these electioneering tactics, 
Khan’s statements are in diametric contrast to 
his proclaimed goals that he wants to improve 
the social conditions of the Pakistani people 
as a whole, including women. In brief, one 
must state that a young school girl was able 
to show not only the way forward how to 
improve the conditions of female citizenry 
regarding education and their social, 
economic and political role in the country. It 
also exposed the thoughtlessness and 
dangerousness of Khan’s black and white 
depictions of the issues of Taliban, militancy, 
US drone strikes, and Pakistan’s relationship 
with the US. Furthermore, it also pointed 
indirectly out that Khan can’t or does not have 
the political will for a substantial social 
change especially towards more gender 
equalities.  
 
Foremost, there is a remarkable indifference, 
even dismissive approach, towards women 
rights. This finds its most significant 
expression in the rejection of the Protection of 
Women’s Rights Bill in 2006 by the PTI. The 
bill was rejected on the basis of it being 
considered partial, i.e. that it served the 
interests of the then government. This is 
hypocritical, since the actual cause for Khan’s 
rejection of the ‘improvement of women rights’ 
was partial too, because he was trying to 
strengthen an alliance with the religious right 
wing forces against former military-turned-
civilian President Pervez Musharraf. 
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However, the condemnation of the Protection 
of Woman Rights Bill was not the only 
example of PTI’s radical and strict ignorance 
of the need for gender equality. Also the 
argument that it was for the ‘higher sake’ to 
challenge the questionable legitimacy of 
Pervez Musharraf’s rule since there were 
already significant indications that his rule will 
not last much longer. In this context, one 
should also mention that on paper the PTI is 
interested in upholding the fundamental rights 
of ‘all citizens’ regardless of caste, creed and 
religion. However, according to the PTI’s 
reading gender inequalities are not included 
in these ideals. In this direction one has to 
note that the former President of the PTI 
Women Wing, Fauzia Kasuri, got disqualified 
for the internal party election on March 22th, 
2013 because of her dual citizenship in 
Pakistan and the US. This is even more 
disturbing since they allow a PTI Women 
Wing in North America but disqualify their 
members for elections in case of a dual 
citizenship. To see this event only in the light 
of an internal power struggle about a certain 
position is too narrow because Kasuri had 
been a long-time follower of Imran’s political 
path. Rather, it seems that the PTI leadership 
rests uncomfortable with having women in the 
party’s influential top positions. In this context, 
it is also notable that Imran Khan recruited 
Ejaz Chaudhary a (former) member of 
Jamaat-e-Islami, a well-known Islamist party, 
as PTI Vice President. Instead of promoting 
progressive forces, it seems that Khan is 
strengthening the reactionary and 
conservative elements in its party in order to 
gain electoral support from the religious right. 
For the sake of completeness in this direction, 
it should also be pointed out that Khan has 
denounced the contentious public debate 
about the controversial blasphemy laws by 
claiming that there are other more pressing 
issues that deserve a higher priority. With 
such a blatant appeasement towards the 
radical religious rights and fundamentalists he 
finally made his mark as ‘thoughtless Taliban 
Khan’. Therefore, the story that the PTI is not 
interested in ‘power politics’ but rather in 
‘initiating reforms’ remains a political myth. 
 
To sum up, by evaluating Imran Khan’s on-
going election campaign one gets the 
feeling that he has a quite ambiguous 
relationship towards human rights, 
especially when it comes to the position of 
women. It is obvious that he is not willing or 
not able to understand that the respect of 
human rights is a fundamental constituent of 
any democratic regime worth carrying the 
name. Narrowing down the democratic 
process just to election as a system to 
recruit the (legitimate) political leadership 
combined with the successive 
rapprochement towards the Taliban and 
their informal induction into the political 
decision-making process is a further 
truncation of the country’s political system. 
Therefore, if Pakistan follows Imran Khan’s 
path, it will soon be characterised as a 
failed democracy and it will risk getting 
dragged into a transformation process that 
will turn the country into a ‘deep state’. This 
basically means that the country is 
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controlled by a small group of influential, 
reactionary anti-democratic forces -a 
situation which is not unknown for the 
country. However, it is also argued that a 
‘deep state’ is featured by several such anti-
systemic groups maintaining an antagonistic 
relationship towards each other but still 
running somehow more or less collectively 
the core affairs of the states behind the 
scenes. Since the Taliban will neither be 
able to re-establish their Islamic theocracy 
in Afghanistan nor to get in power in 
Islamabad but are able to harm significantly 
the political, social and economic 
development of Pakistan, the country’s 
establishment might feel tempted to arrange 
a certain status for the Taliban. This could 
look like this: most likely not to attack them 
in certain areas as well as not to disturb 
them in establishing Shariah and parallel 
administrative structures. Such a scenario 
would stage the setting of a deep state in 
Pakistan and Imran Khan is, deliberately or 
unconsciously, increasingly the harbinger of 
it. Additionally, with this ambiguous political 
manoeuvring Khan is not at all working 
towards a fundamental political change. 
Rather, he enforces the further polarisation 
of Pakistan’s deeply divided society. This 
polarization is not so much about the 
proclaimed fragmentation between the 
stereotype camps of ‘representatives of the 
western secularism who are abandoning the 
traditional Islamic life’ and such ‘people who 
are believing in the time-honoured Islamic 
norms and values’, it is more about the 
strengthening of a split between people who 
are willing to stand up against religious 
extremism and fundamentalism and such 
people who prefer some kind of 
appeasement with the Taliban in order to 
achieve a ‘pseudo peace’. This will 
undoubtedly play into the hands of the 
extremists as it will grant them more and 
more prominence in Pakistan’s political 
landscape which will eventually lead to 
increasing social acceptance of their 
illegitimate, extra-judicial behaviour. 
However, this will have tremendous impact 
on Imran Khan’s feasibility to convince the 
much-needed youth to vote for him. Though 
Pakistan’s youth in general and in particular 
the middle class ones nourish deep 
religious sentiments, this does not 
automatically imply that they have 
sympathies for the Taliban and radical right-
wing religious forces. In this context, one 
could make a point of reference towards 
Hindu-Nationalism in India. The senior 
leadership of the political wing, the 
Bharatiya Janata Party, foremost former 
Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee 
understood clearly that the Indian middle 
class is more interested in economic 
performance of the country and 
subsequently an improvement of their job 
opportunities and living standards than in an 
ideology of hate and discriminatory actions 
against religious minorities. The case of 
Pakistan is likely not to be any different. 
Pakistan’s youth is frustrated with their 
country’s corrupt and clientelistic political 
system and they are desperately looking for 
a leader who will break these socially 
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entrenched patterns. Therefore, as 
indicated above, Khan must stage himself 
as a beacon for change who is ready to 
challenge the perceived reactionary civilian 
and military establishment which is either 
afraid of the Taliban or still think that one 
can talk them into a durable peace deal. 
Only if this works out, Khan will be able to 
transform the people power of his ‘tsunami’ 
into an electoral success. Until then, the PTI 
will be known as an upcoming but ‘untested’ 
political party. However, it does not look like 
this at all and instead of creating a political 
tsunami catching the youth in masses, 
Khans appearance will be nothing more 
than just a short dangerous episode but 
with long term consequences doing more 
harm than good.  
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